Summary - The Military in Politics - George Philips

Introduction

• in much of Latin America, the military has become a natural ruling class

• as of the early 1980s, there are considerable variations between countries and six identifiable patterns of military behaviour

  1. In Brazil and Uruguay, there is still a military—civilian coalition with the military as the dominant partner controlling the presidency.
  2. In Bolivia and Argentina, the military is firmly established but military governments are highly unstable.
  3. In Chile, Panama, and Paraguay, there is an established personalist rule by a military dictator, with stability dependent on the personality of the dictator.
  4. In Peru and Ecuador, there are alternating military and civilian governments, as coups lead to elections leading back to coups.
     • This is the usual pattern in Latin America, but now tends towards long-term military rule.
  5. In much of Central America there is a weaker form of the above pattern, with no genuine elections and military rule more focused on personalism than military institution.
  6. In Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Nicaragua, civilians rule, however the military remains a significant force with institutional privileges, budget access, and independent authority.

• why is the military involved in politics?

  • partly due to historical tradition
    • armies that overthrew the Spanish in the early 19th century no longer had a role in politics, but had a means to gain attention and resources via force
  • related to a lack of international war in Latin America

• who influences the military?

  • because Latin American countries have, until very recently, looked abroad for support, foreign powers such as the US influence the behaviour of the military
  • the US has both encouraged and discouraged military intervention in politics
  • however, US influence is rarely a decisive factor except in small countries and the Caribbean
  • some army officers have developed strong pro-America rules with the US as a result of military collaboration
    • ex. Sorbonne officers in Brazil that fought alongside Allies in WW2
  • however support has also been lost due to too much intervention
    • Peru and Bolivia have had anti-US regimes due to CIA intervention
  • recently, larger countries like Brazil have emerged as arms exporters
  • however LA militaries do not usually spent more than 3% of GNP, no more than civilian governments
    • military presidents have used military spending to strengthen political position in the short term, but can have consequences in the long term

Definition of Institutional Military

• characterized by:
  • high overlap of military rank and political office
  • existence of official/semi-official military ideology to legitimize military rule
  • relatively stable relationships between military in government and certain civilian interest groups
    • ie. economic technocrats, business sector, Church
• implies that they can maintain power despite unpopularity, are highly effective in repressing left-wing and trade union opponents, and can try to control right-wing terrorist organizations

History of Institutional Military

• before this, personalist governments reigned
• the first institutionalized military regime took power in Peru, 1962-1963
  • others followed:
    • Brazil 1964
    • Argentina 1966-1973 + 1976-1983
    • Peru 1968 - 1980
    • Ecuador 1972-1979
    • Uruguay 1973
• institutional structure was similar in each case:
  • senior military officer (usually commander-in-chief) became president
  • support from other senior military officers
  • civilian technocrats brought in for economic positions; finance minister, head of banking
  • military leadership laid lines of policy for civilian technocrats and retained effective institutional control of most matters
    • security, intelligence gathering

Definition of Personalist Military

• characterized by:
  • low overlap between military rank and political office
  • original military coup led by relatively junior officer, or a senior officer that removed rivals from political scene
  • likely to be civilians in government drawn from range of interest groups
  • regime likely to seek to legitimize itself through controlled elections
    • therefore, bound to require certain degree of popularity since complete electoral farce can be damaging
    • not necessarily requiring majority support, but can be vulnerable to middle-class discontent
  • will present themselves as less military than institutional

History of Personalist Military

• until 1960, almost all military regimes in LA were personalist
  • advantage of close communication between military and civilian elites
  • however, not satisfactory by military due to:
    • shared blame with military president, resulting in lack of military support against popular demonstrations
    • military caudillo made it easier for revolutionary opponents of the regime to convert opposition to the ruler into opposition to the political system as a whole
    • as military institution grew, it became increasingly difficult for individuals or small groups of officers to ascend to presidency via military coups
      • needed more people, more planning, more certainty, etc.
    • coups were increasingly led by commanders in chief rather than colonels, that reinforced their position by retaining control of key power centers in the military institution
    • counter-insurgency experts such as those of the US government concluded that institutionalized military governments would be more effective against revolutionaries
      • greater difficulty in leading military officers into internal conflict
• afterwards, institutional military governments took power

Shift from Personalist to Institutional

• key factor: creation of military ideology due to military higher education
  • due to few opportunities for prolonged armed combat and difficulty of opportunistic coups, military seniority was decided by educational performance
• the self confidence brought by education has been a key component in sustaining long periods of military rule and reducing the degree of civilian influence
• education on military matters grew to incorporate education in economic and social problems
  • ex. Brazilian ESG 1949, Peruvian CAEM 1950
• an ideology of military rule spread, asserting the importance of military involvement in civil society to prevent communism through subversion
  • subversion was taught as a major threat by communists
  • subversion was said to be weakened via social reform or rapid economic growth
• through this agenda, the military justified long periods of military rule and increased authority

Social Aspect of Military Governments

• military can rarely be seen as representatives of a single social class or group
  • officers were typical from a lower-middle class, with lower class usually excluded due to importance of secondary education
  • upper-middle class would often seek cushier jobs, such as private companies, law, or banks with less discipline and better pay
• social origin is rarely important, due to social mobility offered to successful officers
• discipline and hardship creates contempt against upper-middle and upper classes
• inheritance played a major role; many officers had children follow them

Behaviour of Military Governments in Politics

• can best be estimated through analysis of institutional interests
• commonly hostility to excessive popular mobilization (“social indiscipline”)
  • sworn against Marxist insurgencies
  • ex. Chilean President Pinochet, when engaged with left-wing revolutionary group MIR, quoted to say “Of course we torture people; we need the information.”
  • revolutions have succeeded against personalist rulers such as Batista, but not against institutional ones
• treat trade unions and newspapers with disfavor, but not total suppression
  • ie. limited censorship
• tolerate limited opposition activity, but react if pushed too far
• generally, will react against strong popular organizations but try to foster weaker ones to control them

Military Governments and Economic Policies

• difficult to generalize
• military governments of Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, and Argentina 1976 took power during economic crises
  • responded with IMF-style stabilization packages that increased unemployment but reduced inflation
  • also dismantled high tax structures
• Peru 1968 pursued slightly expansionist policies initially, then shifted to a highly expansionist one resulting in crisis in 1976-1978
• on a long term basis, differences are more evident
  • ex. Pinochet regime in Chile after 1973
    • pursued free market policies
  • ex. Brazil
    • development of state capitalism with public enterprises playing a role in capital formation
• preference for state industry and development of heavy industry due to security
  • however, can be placed secondary if given advice by civilian technocrats
  • ex. Peruvian government took some policies of social reform, such as land reform
• generally, few military governments are interested in large-scale income redistribution (although few civilian governments too)

Conclusion

• military governments are generally durable but not immortal
  • due to ability to make change to remain in power
• military disunity or economic failure can undermine military regimes, but can be handled by changes internally
• previous perspective was that civilian rule was normal; however in the 1970s, this was no longer the case