Chapter 3: Japan’s Actions
| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 1928 | Jun: Assassination of Zhang Zuolin |
| 1931 | Sept: Japanese invasion of Manchuria |
| 1932 | Jan: First ‘Shanghai Incident’ Mar: Manchuria becomes Manchukuo |
| 1933 | Feb: Eastern Monroe Doctrine announced, Japan leaves League of Nations |
| 1936 | Feb: attempted military coup in Japan Sep: Japan signs anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany |
| 1937 | Jul: start of Second Sino-JP War Dec: Rape of Nanjing |
| 1938 | Jul: start of ‘Border War’ with USSR |
| 1939 | Aug: Japan defeated at battle of Khalkhin-Gol; ceasefire in ‘Border War’ |
| 1940 | Jul: ‘Main Principles of Fundamental National Policy’ announced Aug: ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ announced Sep: Tripartite Pact signed; Japanese forces enter north Indo-China; US announces economic sanctions against Japan |
| 1941 | Apr: Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact Jun: Nazi invasion of Soviet Union begins Jul: Imperial Conference; Japan invades South Indochina; US trade ban on Japan & assets frozen Dec: Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor |
3.1 What happened in Manchuria and Northern China, 1931-6?
Japan had secured a position and invested interests into Manchuria, which the Japanese army was determined to hold. This resulted in an expansionist policy to control Manchuria in 1931 that evolved to target mainland China by 1936.
Japanese nationalists, arguing for the viability of an empire to achieve self-sufficiency, turned to Manchuria for a variety of reasons:
- its close proximity to Japan
- rich raw materials (coal, iron ore, bauxite)
- people (who purchased Japanese goods and could be used for cheap labor)
- relative weakness of China
In 1927, China achieved a unified national government under Jiang Jieshi, who sought to control all of China. The Japanese Guangdong (Kwantung) Army sought to prevent the Nationalist government from regaining control over Manchuria, initially partnering with the warlord Zhang Zuolin in control of Manchuria, but later assassinating him (in June 1928) after he retreated rather than fighting Jiang’s forces. However, his son announced support of Jiang, so Kwantung Army officers began plotting to overthrow him.
This resulted in the Mukden incident (Sept. 18 1931), a manufactured attack on part of the South Manchurian Railway. The plan was initially opposed by the Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro, who was then forced to resign over failure to control the military and solve the economic problems.
The new prime minister Inukai Tsuyoshi also failed to get the Kwantung Army to comply with the League of Nations’ ruling to withdraw back to the SMR area, and instead they captured key cities and moved north.
China, angry over this, began to fight Japan in Shanghai, which was in-response bombed. This caused international criticism of Japan, but fighting continued under advice of Japanese war minister Sadao Araki until March 4, when the League demanded a ceasefire that only the Chinese obeyed. On May 5, the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement was signed, forcing China to demilitarize around Shanghai while Japan maintained its presence. This aroused increasing nationalistic feelings in Japan, resulting in them deciding to transform Manchuria into a puppet state in Feb 1932, and doing so in March with the former Chinese Manchu emperor Puyi on the throne.
‘Incidents’ continued along the border between Northern China and Manchuria. Political disorder from Jiang’s extermination campaigns allowed Japanese forces to invade, capturing Rehe province in 1933 and continuing southwards in 1934. By 1936, they captured Chahaer and Suiyuan, and parts of Hebei and Shanxi. Jiang’s focus on the communists prevented him from resisting Japanese invasion.
3.2 What were the main aspects of the Second Sino-Japanese War, from 1937-41?
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria (‘China Incident’) was a prelude to the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 (the first one being from 1894-95). This was the culmination of decades of imperialist policy aiming to dominate China and its access to food, raw materials, and labor. Japan considered itself poor, and in the mid-1930s Japanese nationalists were determined to change that.
Prelude
The invasion of Manchuria was not seen as an inevitable step towards Japanese military aggression and expansion in China. A month before the war in June 1937, Konoe Fumimaro, a moderate leader adopted the idea of an ‘Asiatic Monroe Doctrine’ (preventing European expansion in Asia), which had been first proclaimed by the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations in Feb 1933.
China did not accept the independence of Manchukuo. Initially in the 1930s, Japanese governments called for friendly relations with ‘Japanese leadership’. In 1935, Nationalist China established diplomatic relations with Japan, but by mid-1935 the Kwantung Army continued to push for Hebei and Chahar (provinces north of Beijing) to become autonomous zones, after using anti-Japanese protests as an excuse to insist of Nationalist demilitarization of the areas.
In September 1936, the Anti-Comintern pact (by prime minister Koki Hirota) was signed with Nazi Germany, which Fascist Italy joined in 1937.
War Begins
On 7 July 1937, one month after Konoe became prime minister, Japanese provoked a minor clash at the Marco Polo Bridge outside Beijing, but were met with stiff resistance. This triggered the Second Sino-JP War, as the Japanese claimed the Chinese had fired upon them and started attaching Chinese army bases around Beijing. While government negotiations began, Japanese army hardliners wanted more than a settlement.
However, main leaders of the Kwantung Army (such as Ishiwara) were concerned about the Soviet Union and reluctant to start a full-scale war. They tried to persuade Hirota (who in Feb 1937 had been replaced as prime minister to become Minister of War), but failed. Konoe supported this and sent more troops while blaming the Chinese for the incident.
This led to protests, and despite a ceasefire, clashes continued due to insistence of army officers and militarists to provoke a clash that would justify a full-scale invasion. While previous incidents had been settled by compromise, Beijing’s strategic and emotional importance made the attack on it a turning point.
Another ‘incident’ in Shanghai (China’s most important port) led to Japanese army advances and clashes by mid-August. The KMT ordered a general mobilization, which resulted in an all-out war. Nationalist sentiments and the Japanese press openly supported the effort.
Japan met little resistance due to the weakness of China:
- China unified in 1927 but still struggled with warlords and civil war, while Japan modernized since 1868
- loss of Manchuria and various concessions
Thus, Japan captured Shanghai by Nov 1937, and then the capital Nanjing in Dec 1937. However, Japanese belief in racial superiority as part of the nationalist ideology and schooling system resulted in many atrocities—the Rape of Nanjing.
War Continues
After capturing Nanking. Japan took effective control of most of Northern China by the end of 1937, forcing Jiang to retreat and establish a wartime capital in Chongqing. By 1938, Japan had over 1 million troops in China, and controlled all major cities in provinces around the Yangtze River (China’s most fertile and densely-populated area). They would also capture Wuhan, Guangzhou, and Hainan.
Nazi Germany initially offered to mediate between Japan and China to get Japan to focus on the USSR, but Japan sought harsh conditions that China disagreed with. Konoe took this as rejection and ended negotiation, ordering for the war to continue. Japanese forces would capture the whole coastal area from north to south and move inland, targeting the new capital Hango, as well as Chongqing.
However, the KMT resisted and over the next 5 years, no further advance was made. A war of attrition followed in the mountainous areas of China, and while from 1938 onwards Japan maintained control of large cities, railways, airfields, ports, and roads, the countryside remained under Chinese control.
However by Dec 1931, the attack on Pearl Harbor created problems for Japan’s armed forces (~2 million, almost 50%) in China.
3.3 Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbour in 1941?
The attack was due to several factors, both short-term and long-term.
Military Factions & Foreign Policy 1937-40
In Nov. 1937, some hardline Japanese officers tried to start a war with the UK & U.S. by attacking their gunships off the Chinese coast, but the Japanese government quickly apologized and paid compensation.
By 1935, there were several main factions, mainly the ‘Imperial Way’ faction and ‘Control’ faction.
| Imperial Way (Kodo-ha) | Control (Tosei-ha) | |
|---|---|---|
| Leaders | Generals Araki Sadao and Mazaki Jinzaburo | Nagata Tetsuzan, Future PM Tojo Hideki |
| Beliefs | ultra-nationalism supremacy of Japanese soldiers if imbued with ‘spiritual power’ (Yamato spirit) | didn’t favor political violence sought to modernize Japanese army (tanks & planes) saw modern war as requiring total war — utilizing all resources |
| Actions | officers favored violent actions to overturn the existing system | didn’t support violence, but still interfered in politics |
| Supporters | supporters of Strike-North faction, seeking to expand into Siberia at the expense of the USSR | supporters of ‘Strike-South’ faction, seeking to expand into SEA and Oceania |
Conflict erupted between the two factions in mid-1935, after General Hayashi Senjuro (the war minister) removed General Mazaki from the post of Inspector General of Military Education (all top 3 army positions). This was seen as an attempt by Mazaki supporters to weaken the Kodo-ha faction after the discovery in 1934 of a kodo-ha conspiracy to assassinate statesmen to form a military government.
| The February 26 Plot | |
|---|---|
| Initiation | - started as Nagata (chief of military affairs) was blamed and assassinated by another officer - supported by Mazaki and other generals, with financial support from right-wing businessmen and politicians - plotters from the First Division attacked before going to Manchuria |
| Process | - dispatched assassination squads to kill prominent political and government officials - prime minister Okada (survived) - former PM Saito (killed) - minister of finance Takahashi Korekiyo (killed) - general Watanabe Jotaro (killed) - emperor did not support the coup, thus martial law was proclaimed and the plotters surrendered - some suicided, others executed |
| Impacts | - weakened Kodo-ha factions as generals were kept from important positions - Tosei-ha faction rose with belief in centralized order - political leaders were increasingly wary of opposing the military - army influence greatly increased over the gov’t - war minister (decided by army) exercised veto power over cabinet appointments |
One of the first acts of Hirota’s government was to proclaim “The Fundamental Principles of National Policy”, which:
- affirmed need to…
- consolidate Japan’s position in East Asia
- advance into South Sea
- suggested…
-
moderate policy toward China
-
strong stance toward Soviet Russia
-
Hirota was then forced to resign, and in June 1937 Prince Konoe Fumimaro was appointed as next PM.
He was initially seen as a moderate, but later became hardline:
- opposed international cooperation
- forming a ‘bloc’
- becoming a ‘have’ nation (then a ‘have-not’ nation)
This attitude played an important part in the outbreak of war in July.
Zaibatsu
Zaibatsu (industrial-financial entities) cooperated with militarists to pursue an expansionist imperialist foreign policy. Mitsubishi made 30% of ships and began to produce the Zero fighter plane. Their connection to the military gave them access to raw materials, establishing greater monopolies that small-mid companies couldn’t combat.
Expansion on the Chinese mainland was seen as a way of overcoming the depression and addressing the population problem, and thus zaibatsu were active in Manchuria. By 1940, Japanese businesses owned ~85% of capital investments and imposed harsh exploitation on Chinese laborers (1/3rd wages).
Growing Regional Influence of the US
Resentment formed at the growing US influence in Asia and the Pacific, partially due to Roosevelt’s speech in 1899 (before being elected as VP) to call for aggressive expansionist foreign policy, and influenced by the view of civilising non-white people. This got worse after 1901, as Roosevelt was elected president.
This approach was shown after the Spanish-American War 1898 when the US established control over the Philippines, Cuba, Hawaii, and Guam. Conflicts with Japan’s interests began to emerge as US business and military presence expanded in the Pacific.
The Soviet Union
There was a growing realization that advances into Soviet territory would be difficult. In July 1938 during the war with China, some army officers tried to challenge the Soviet Union at Changkufen on the Siberia / Manchuria / Korea border, but were decisively defeated and forced to accept a settlement. They were again defeated in August 1939 at the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol.
With the invasion in China getting costly and a larger army being needed, the common agreement was that expansion into SEA and the Pacific was easier.
Tripartite Pact
Hardline nationalists in Japan pushed for closer links to Germany and Italy in 1937, and especially after Hitler’s conquests from 1938-40. They were initially distrustful of each other — Fascist Italy didn’t trust Nazi Germany, while Nazi Germany supported China rather than Japan. The first step to an alliance was in May 1930, when Germany and Italy signed the Pact of Steel.
In July 1940, Konoe formed a government with support of militarists and ultra-nationalists. He formulated ‘The Main Principles of Fundamental National Policy’ and officially endorsed Hakko Ichiu, the belief in uniting the entire world — ‘eight corners of the world under one roof.’ These ideas were also behind the announcement of Japan’s Monroe Doctrine in 1933.
The Fundamental National Policy called for the establishment of a New Order in Greater East Asia, based on the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. In late July, the document was approved by the cabinet and supreme command, even if it involved military conflicts with the US and UK. Emphasis was put on building the armed forces, ending the war in China, and further economic planning. On Aug. 1 1940 the plans for the Co-Prosperity Sphere were publicly announced.
After the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in Aug 1939, Japan initially withdrew from the Anti-Comintern pact in anger. However relations improved and Konoe’s government signed the Tripartite (Three-Power Axis Alliance) Pact in September 1940.
The Tripartite Pact:
- Berlin, 27 Sept. 1940
- confirmed intentions of 3 countries to establish new order
- defensive military alliance
- warned US (neutral) to not intervene in Asia and Europe, as allies would respond
- did not include promise of declaring war; only assistance to allies
- agreed that none of them would sign separate peace with US
- motivated by benefits; distracting Europe/US in Europe/Asia would let them make their own moves
However, Germany & Italy declared war on the US after the Pearl Harbor attack.
Invasion of Indo-China (Sept. 1940)
The move on French Indo-China and the US reaction was another factor.
In late Sept 1940, following France’s defeat by Nazi Germany in June, a small Japanese force entered and occupied a northern part of French Indo-china, partly after having reached agreement with Vichy French authorities. This was linked to the Second Sino-JP War, as it would stop the KMT from importing arms and fuel along the Sino-Indo-China Railway.
Initially, it was believed that this wouldn’t provoke war with the US, and in caution Japan didn’t commit large numbers of troops and didn’t move into southern Indo-china. Further, debates between the Strike-North and Strike-South factions continued, and there was concern of what action the Soviet Union would take. However, the US responded by imposing economic sanctions to reduce imports of oil, iron, and machinery, which were vital to Japan’s war. The military began pressuring the government to sanction action to obtain alternative supplies.
When deciding to move into Indo-china, the decision to attack either the USSR or the US was not made. However the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact (Apr. 13 1941) had been made. Additionally, despite thinking the Red Army would be weak after Stalin’s purges, border clashes proved otherwise. Thus, Japan looked towards moving South.
With Hitler invading the USSR in late June 1941, Japan concluded there was no Soviet threat to Manchuria, and thus held an Imperial Conference in July 1941 to decide on expansion in SEA and the Pacific, even at the risk of war against US and Britain. On July 28 1941, a large Japanese army moved into southern Indo-China.
Ultimate Decision to Attack
The US reaction to JP movement into Southern? Indo-china:
- total ban on vital supplies: oil, iron, aircrafts
- freezing Japanese assets in the US
This pushed Japan to extend its Co-prosperity Sphere in order to access oil and rubber in the Dutch East Indies, Philippines (US), Malaya (British).
To do this, Japan’s military government decided to knock out the US’s Pacific fleet which was being reinforced. This led to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as simultaneous attacks on British and Dutch colonies. This action was referred to as the Greater East Asia War, including the Sino-JP War (referred to as the Japan-China Incident), as well as the new conflict with Britain and the US. The idea was to gain independence for Asian nations with the help of Japanese armies.
The Japanese government assumed this would be a knock-out blow, forcing the US to agree to further Japanese expansion in SEA, but the superior industrial capacity and raw material supply of the US turned the war into one of attrition. This put Japan’s economy under great strain—especially with the Depression and the Sino-JP war.